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BANK SIZE, RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND SME FINANCING:
EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH
This paper examines the effect of bank size on relationship lending and how relationship lend-
ing can affect credit availability, interest rates and collateral to SMEs in the context of Bangladesh.
Our empirical results suggest that SMEs with a long-term relationship with small banks have more
access to finance than from large banks. However, we did not find any evidence that long-term
relationship with small banks can reduce interest rates or collateral requirements for SMEs. We
find evidence though that a stronger and much more exclusive relationship with a small bank can
reduce the interest rates for SMEs. This mixed evidence suggests that small banks do not have full
comparative advantage in processing soft information, but large banks in Bangladesh may have
different lending techniques to extend loans to SMEs with similar interest rates and collateral
requirements as like as small banks. Furthermore, we find evidence that small banks are giving
priority to both long-term relationship and collateral requirement for SME credit risk than large
banks. 
Keywords: small and medium enterprises; small banks; large banks; long-term relationship; collat-
eral; Bangladesh.
JEL classification: G21; L26; O16.
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ВЗАЄМОЗВ’ЯЗОК МІЖ РОЗМІРОМ БАНКУ,
КРЕДИТУВАННЯМ НА ДОВІРІ ТА ФІНАНСУВАННЯМ МСБ:
ЗА ДАНИМИ БАНГЛАДЕШ
У статті оцінено вплив розміру банку на кредитування на довірі, а також як саме
довірчі взаємовідносини можуть вплинути на доступність кредиту, його відсоткову став-
ку та обсяг заставного майна малого та середнього бізнесу (МСБ) на прикладі Бангладеш.
Емпіричні результати демонструють, що МСБ при тривалих відносинах з малими банка-
ми має кращий доступ до фінансових ресурсів, ніж у випадку з великими банками. Однак
не знайдено підтвердження тому, що тривалі відносини з малими банками знижують про-
центні ставки або обсяг заставного майна при кредитуванні МСБ. У той же час знайде-
но підтвердження тому, що довірчі відносини з малим банком можуть знизити відсотко-
ві ставки в бізнес-кредитуванні. Таким чином, отримано досить суперечливі дані і можна
припустити, що малі банки мають деякі переваги щодо обробки неформальних якісних
даних про клієнтів, в той час як великі банки в Бангладеш мають більше технічних мож-
ливостей адаптувати свої вимоги щодо відсоткових ставок та застави для конкурування
з малими банками. Також доведено, що для малих банків в пріоритеті довготривалі відно-
сини з клієнтами та вимоги щодо застави, які б мінімізували кредитні ризики.
Ключові слова: малі та середні підприємства; малі банки; великі банки; довготривалі від-
носини; заставне майно; Бангладеш.
Табл. 4. Літ. 49.
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В статье оценено влияние размера банка на кредитование на доверии, а также как
именно доверительные взаимоотношения могут повлиять на доступность кредита, его
процентную ставку и объём залогового имущества малого и среднего бизнеса (МСБ) на
примере Бангладеш. Эмпирические результаты показали, что МСБ при длительных
отношениях с малыми банками имеют больший доступ к финансовым ресурсам, чем в
случае с большими банками. Однако не найдено подтверждения тому, что длительные
отношения с малыми банками снижают процентные ставки или объём залогового иму-
щества при кредитовании МСБ. В то же время найдено доказательство тому, что дове-
рительные отношения с малым банком могут снизить процентные ставки по бизнес-кре-
диту. Таким образом, получены довольно противоречивые данные и можно предположить,
что малые банки имеют некоторые преимущества в плане обработки неформальных
качественных данных о клиентах, а большие банки в Бангладеш имеют больше техниче-
ских возможностей адаптировать свои требования по процентным ставкам и залогу для
конкуренции с малыми банками. Также доказано, что для малых банков в приоритете
долгосрочные отношения с клиентами и требования по залогу, минимизирующие кредит-
ные риски.
Ключевые слова: малые и средние предприятия; малые банки; большие банки; долгосрочные
отношения; залоговое имущество; Бангладеш.
Introduction. Lack of formal finance and credit constraints have become one of
the main problems for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because it is
argued that SMEs are more informationally opaque and their growth prospects are
difficult to evaluate than that of large firms. Therefore, lending to small firms requires
alternative lending techniques (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2005). It is also highlighted
in literature that lending to SMEs needs special relationship building through a long-
term banking process by which it will be possible for banks to know more private
information and also future growth prospects of a firm (Berger et al., 2014; Berger
and Udell, 2005). W. Mahmud (2006) revealed that SMEs in Bangladesh have only
10% access to credit from commercial banks and the rest of capital is contributed by
either personal finance or via credits from microfinance institutions. Similarly, a
recent study by M.Z. Hoque et al. (2016) find that 89% of the firms in their sample
received loans from microfinance institutions and which suggests that formal com-
mercial bank loans are still rigid in Bangladesh.
Relationship lending which is one of the most common techniques for lending
to small firms is based on soft information received by maintaining a close relation-
ship with a client. Alternatively, there are some other lending techniques known as
transaction-based lending techniques. Those are mainly based on hard information,
for example, financial statements based lending, asset based lending or credit scoring.
It is argued that soft business information cannot be evaluated easily like hard infor-
mation due to its qualitative nature and collection of soft information is more costly
(Berger and Udell, 2006). It is suggested that the soft information generation and its
careful investigation can increase lending efficiency of a bank, thereby reducing cre-
dit risk and ultimately increasing access to finance for business (Berger and Black,
2011; Belas et al., 2014a; Cole et al., 2004; D’Aurizio et al., 2015). It reveals that soft
information generated from banking relationships cannot be analysed like hard infor-
mation on a firm (Cipova and Belas, 2012). Nevertheless, relationship banking can
increase trust between banks credit officers and SME clients and that can help credit
officer analyse credit risks of the client.
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The existing literature suggests that small banks are more efficient in processing
soft information than large banks due to their simple organizational structure and also
they devote more assets in relationship-based lending (Ongena and Smith, 2001;
Berger and Black, 2011). R. DeYoung et al. (2004) argue that small banks extensively
use soft information for evaluating credit to small firms and, as a result, they can pro-
vide special banking services to SMEs as compared to large banks. It is also recom-
mended that small banks make more personal contact with their clients and by which
they can exert private information for lending and also they can build trust between
banks and clients (Berger et al., 2002). On the other hand, it is quite difficult for large
banks to make personal or frequent contact with their clients due to large number of
diversified customers. As a result, relationship lending is not an optimal choice for
large banks due to difficulty in private information generation (Cole et al., 2004).
Banking structure and lending to SMEs has received huge attention of
researchers because if small banks have a comparative advantage in lending to small
firms than large banks, then SME borrowers should go to small banks to get finance
otherwise they will be credit rationed and this will hinder their growth. In this con-
text, the objective of the paper is to evaluate whether the size of the bank matters in
relationship lending in Bangladesh, and if so which type of banks, large or small ones,
are more efficient in relationship lending for SMEs. On the other hand, if small banks
are in superior position in processing private information for lending to SMEs, then
it could be the fact that small firms may have an easy access to finance in small banks.
Moreover, we want to evaluate that if small banks have a comparative advantage in
relationship lending then it is possible that SMEs borrowers will get loans with lower
interest rates as well as with lower collateral requirements a result of information
transparency.
On the basis of literature, we have also classified banks according to their total
assets (Berger et al., 2005a; Shen et al., 2009; Uchida et al., 2008). The results of this
study suggest that long-term banking relationship with small banks can increase cre-
dit availability for SMEs. Thus, we find evidence that small banks may have compar-
ative advantage in processing small business loans and which is also documented in
some other studies, for example A.N. Berger et al. (2001a), D.A. Carter et al. (2004),
A.N. Berger et al. (2005a) and H. Uchida et al. (2008). We also find that stronger
bank-borrower relationship can reduce interest rates for SMEs when getting loans
from small banks. Therefore, it suggests that small banks do generate private infor-
mation from their clients by relationship lending, which helps small banks screen
their clients more cautiously and provide loans under lower interest rates. However,
we did not find any significant difference between bank sizes with collateral require-
ment in relationship banking. Thus, it suggests that banking relationship will not
reduce collateral requirement for SMEs regardless bank sizes and which suggests a
rather conservative approach to banking practice in Bangladesh.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to document bank size and
SME relationship lending phenomenon in the context of Bangladesh. This paper
contributes to understanding the viability of investment in customer relationship
banking by commercial banks and its impact on building long-term relationship for
small business lending. More importantly, current research will also enable SME
owners to select banks according to their business size and needs. If small banks are
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more efficient with SME loans then SMEs should go to small banks rather than to
large ones. Therefore, this research provide valuable insights for small banks in the
context of intermediation process.
Literature review. Empirical literature suggests that a long-term banking rela-
tionship offers some benefits to small business in the form of more credit availability
and lower prices of loans. For example, interest rates and collateral and, therefore,
small businesses benefit from banking relationships. M. Kano et al. (2006) show that
long-term and stronger relationship helps reduce interest rates for small business,
similar results are also found in A.N. Berger and G.F. Udell (2001) and more recent-
ly by P. Bolton et al. (2013). J. Comeig et al. (2015), V. Kysucky and L. Norden
(2014). It is also documented that long-term relationship helps SMEs get more access
to finance and also with reduced collateral requirements (Degryse and Cayseele,
2000; Uchida et al., 2012; Cenni et al., 2015; Ferri and Murro, 2015; Gama and
Durate, 2015). Furthermore, SMEs are benefited from lending relationship with
lower dependency on trade credit and increased protection from their main banks
during their financial distressed situation (Uchida et al., 2008; Cenni et al., 2015).
Regardless of various benefits provided by bank-borrower relationship for SMEs,
sometimes it is difficult to lend money to small business due to information asymme-
try associated with small business loans. Most of the time small firms are credit
rationed and suffer from less access to finance from financial institutions, especially
from banks (Kozubikova et al., 2015). Since small business lending requires a careful
investigation of soft qualitative information, it suggests that small banks are more effi-
cient to do that due to their simple organizational structure and smaller number of cus-
tomers (Canales and Nanda, 2012; Carter et al., 2004). In contrast, large banks have
more difficult organizational diagram and most of them make centralized decisions on
loans, as a result, transfer of soft information is difficult within large banking organi-
zational structure as compared to hard information which is based on accounting
numbers (Berger et al., 2001b; Berger and Udell, 2002). Therefore, relatively easy
transferability of soft information through small banking structure gives small banks an
advantage over large banks and that is why small banks should be more efficient in
small business lending than large ones (Carter et al., 2004; DeYoung et al., 2004).
It is also argued that banking relationships and sharing insider business informa-
tion may not always generate benefits for small business where the effect of bank size
is irrelevant. J. Stein (2014) shows that excessive private information sharing with
bank can be a suboptimal choice for small business. The result shows that firms with
a substantial relationship with their main bank need to provide higher interest rates
due to a hold-up problem. V. Kysucky and L. Norden (2014) stated that hold-up
problem can increase the collateral requirement for small business and which is much
more serious in bank-based economies than market-based economies. A. Ono and
I. Uesugi (2009) find that a long-term banking relationship cannot be a suitable
choice for firms if they want to ask for collateral free loans. Because collateral works
as an incentive for banks to invest in relationship banking and banks want to create
their seniority over the firm asset through relationship banking.
The existing literature also suggests that it is not always the bank size that affects
the relationship lending or soft information generation, but bank-firm distance and
banking competition also influence soft information generation. It is argued that if a
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firm is located far from a bank it is difficult for a credit officer to get access to infor-
mation due to infrequent visit to business or less contact with firm owner (Agarwal
and Hauswald, 2010; Berger et al., 2005b; Uchida et al., 2012). The above literature
also states that small firms are mostly situated far from the city. However, most of large
banks are situated in the main city, whereas small banks are situated in local areas. As
a result, small banks have a comparative advantage to know more about local culture
and business situation than large banks and thus small banks can make more efficient
loans to small business than the large ones. In the context of market competition it is
argued that when bank competition is high, relationship lending will have minimal
impact on the benefits of long-term banking relationship (Berger et al., 2004;
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Kano et al., 2006). The reason is that at a competitive
market borrower can switch easily from one bank to another and hence banks are
reluctant to invest in this relationship. 
A recent study by T. Beck et al. (2015) shows that under global economic crisis
(2007–2009) relationship lending played a significant role for providing credits to
small firms. The relationship developed through the banking process allowed banks
provide credit to SMEs, since they had better information about the firm due to their
past relationship. On the other hand, large and foreign banks reduced their credits to
SMEs because of financial instability and this also reduced business turnover of
SMEs. It is also highlighted that credits provided based on private business informa-
tion which performed well and default rates were higher for large banks due to their
excessive reliance on credit rating models which is mainly based on accounting infor-
mation of firms. There are numerous studies which document that solely accounting
information cannot fully comply with the credit risk of firms, however, the addition
of personal characteristics and management skills of SMEs owners can significantly
improve credit rating models (Altman and Sabato, 2007; Belas and Cipova, 2013;
Grunert et al., 2005). 
It can be also highlighted that not all firms benefit similarly from lending rela-
tionships. Depending on firms characteristics it could be so that bank-borrower rela-
tionships may fluctuate with access to credit and also with interest rates and collater-
al. E. Bracanti (2015) shows that microfirms at Italian market are much more credit
constrained than small or medium firms. As a result, microfirms benefit more from
relationship lending than small and medium firms. A study by W. Lee et al. (2015) at
the UK market shows that micro and small firms rely more on relationship banking
than medium firms. They also argued that as medium firms have more assets they can
ask for loans from non-relationship banks or large banks as they can show their cred-
it worthiness due to their comparatively larger asset base than micro and small firms.
Other literature also highlighted the firm size effect on lending relationships and also
that benefits from relationship banking differ by firm size (Lehman and Neuberger,
2001; Cole et al., 2004; Belas et al., 2014b; Blazy and Weill, 2013).
Hypotheses. We expect that there may be a significant difference between bank
size and its impact on relationship lending and ultimately the outcome (credit avail-
ability, interest rates and collateral) of the relationship lending process. Hence,
according to the expectation our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: There is a relationship between bank size and a long-term relationship on
the approval of credits to SMEs.
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H2: There is a relationship between bank size and a long long-term relationship
on lending interest rates to SMEs.
H3: There is a relationship between bank size and a stronger relationship in
reducing interest rates on future loans to SMEs.
H4: There is a relationship between bank size and a long-term relationship on
collateral requirement for SMEs.
H5: There is a relationship between bank size and both long-term and collateral
on reducing SME credit risk.
Data and methodology. This study uses the data collected by one of the authors
during June-August 2015 via self-administered questionnaire survey of banks credit
officers who are dealing only with SME finance. Purposively, we have selected only
SME credit officers so that we can "tease out" the most essential information from
them, what they consider for loan proposals. The initial target of the survey was to
collect data at least from one credit officer from all the scheduled commercial banks
operating in Bangladesh, which covers public (government-owned), private and for-
eign banks (total – 56). Finally, we have collected data from 110 credit officers from
44 commercial banks, mainly from their different branches operating in Dhaka (the
capital of the country). Our data set is quite unique in a sense that most of the study
performed within the bank-size and relationship lending arena were collected from
SME owners or firm level data, see for example A.N. Berger et al. (2005a) and
H. Uchida et al. (2008). However, our data set is directly from SME credit officers
and we believe they are the main authority in relationship banking to process and
transmit data to upper authority for further decision-making. Hence, credit officers’
opinion can be more valuable in a relationship lending than what the SME owners
thinks about their relationships with the bank. 
Since the aim of the paper is to investigate the connection between bank size and
SME relationship lending, this study measures the size of banks on the basis of total
assets. Bank total assets is also used in different other papers to differentiate between
small and large banks (Berger et al., 2005a; Uchida et al., 2008; Shen et al. (2009).
Bank total assets and all other secondary data used in our analyses are collected from
the annual reports and audited financial statements of the banks (published in 2014).
We did not use the banks financial statements for the year 2015 because the state-
ments for this year are yet to be audited. The study uses descriptive statistics such as
mean to gain understanding about the banks size. In addition, this study applied Chi-
square test to examine the hypotheses.
Summary statistics by bank size and bank types. Table 1 presents the summary sta-
tistics of the full sample of 44 banks as well as segmented analysis across bank size
from the total number of banks. The mean "Bank age" is 22 years, thus the banks are
not so old, neither very young. It is noticeable that on average "SME Advance to Total
Advance Ratio" is about 15%. Although the ratio is not so high, A.D. De La Torre et
al. (2010) found that banks' exposure to SME segment ranges from 6% to 37%. 
In the context of bank size comparison, we have classified the sample according
to total assets. To differentiate between small and large banks we calculated the mean
value of total assets of our full sample and then bank’s total assets is equal or more
than the mean of the full sample is recognized as a large bank and rest of banks are
classified as small banks. Table 1 clearly shows there is a significant difference
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between small and large banks with regards to various indicators. For example, the
mean "Bank age" of the small banks is around 17 years whereas the mean "Bank age"
of large banks is 29 years. Moreover, there is a significant difference in terms of the
mean "Number of Total Branches" as well as in "Number of Total Employees" and all
other variables. One interesting finding from Table 1 is that bank size and "SME
Advance to Total Advance Ratio". The mean of "SME Advance to Total Advance
Ratio" is higher for the large bank (16) than for small bank (14). Although the differ-
ence is only by 2%, nonetheless, it can be argued that large banks are investing in
SMEs more than small ones. Therefore, it is a good sign for SMEs that they can ask
for loans from large banks as well. This information also indicates that small banks are
not only specialized in small loans, but large banks can also provide funds to SMEs
may be with their diversified number of branches all over the country or may be with
technology based lending beyond relationship lending.
We also run ANOVA tests to look at whether the mean differences are statistical-
ly significant. In particular, the results of F-tests indicate that mean bank age, mean
assets, mean deposits are statistically significantly different across the bank size.
However, the mean advance on SMEs are not statistically significantly different
across the bank size.
Table 2 presents the segmented analysis across bank ownership types (public,
private and foreign) based on our total sample of 44 banks out of 56 banks in
Bangladesh. The aim of the segmentation is to find out the differences among each
type of banks and more especially which types of banks are providing more loans to
SMEs. It is noticeable that public banks are dominating private and foreign banks in
terms of all the variables except for "SME Advance to Total Advance Ratio". In that
case, private and foreign banks are higher than public banks. Especially with regards
to SME loan portfolio, private banks are outperforming public banks by 10% and for-
eign banks – by 9%. This indicates that private banks are intensively investing in the
SME sector and they are recognizing the diversification of their portfolio to SMEs.
As we see in Table 1, "SME Advance to Total Advance Ratio" is higher for large banks
than for small ones, after the segmented analysis it makes a clearer sense that it can
be the result of large private banks which is a part of our large bank sample. This result
is very similar to the result of (Beck et al., 2011), they found that private banks invest
in SMEs more than public or foreign banks as a result of their better relationships
with clients. However, the difference between public and foreign banks in terms of
"SME Advance to Total Advance Ratio" is not so significant, it is also possible that
pubic and foreign banks are more concerned about corporate clients rather than SME
clients. Since A.N. Berger et al. (2001b) argue that foreign banks have difficulties in
providing credits to SMEs due to less relationship lending. Furthermore, they also
stated that foreign banks have a large asset base therefore, they can finance large cor-
porate firms rather than SMEs because the cost of relationship lending is high.
Moreover, T. Beck et al. (2011) claimed that foreign banks prefer providing loans to
large asset base companies and they avoid risky relationship lending to minimize
credit risks.
Table 3 presents the descriptions of the survey questions used to construct the
relationship between bank size and SME relationship lending from 110 SME credit
officers, representatives of 44 banks in Bangladesh. The respondents were given five-
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point Likert scale questions to disclose their opinions about relationship lending that
are ranging from "strongly disagree" (1 point) to "strongly agree" (5 points). In line
with the existing literature we recognise a relationship as a long-term relationship
when the relationship between a bank and a borrower is minimum 5 or more than
5 years (Berger and Udell, 2002; Cheng et al., 2015).
In this paper we use 5 questions to measure 5 hypotheses. About 46% of the loan
officers believe that long-term relationship with banks is very important in order to
access credit. This result suggests that banking relationship is valued by credit officers
for extending loans and relationship matters in SME lending. Second, with regards to
borrowers with a long-term banking relationships and reduced interest rates on lend-
ing, this study finds mixed results. For example, about 38% of the officers believe that
long-term relationship is not helpful to lower the interest rates and on the other hand,
about 31% believe that long-term relationship can lower the interest rate. Third, how-
ever, this study finds that a stronger bank-borrower relationship can reduce interest
rates. Hence, it could the fact that strong relationship may increase trust between
banks and SME borrowers and therefore, loan officers are willing to provide loans
under lower interest rate. Fourth, the survey result also suggests that a long lasting
relationship not only helps get loans but also it facilitates lower collateral as a result
of more information from borrowers during the course of relationship. Finally, with
regards to both collateral and personal relationship on SME credit risk management,
the results show that both long-term relationship and collateral are important for
lowering SME credit risk. Thus, it reveals that a long-term relationship, as well as col-
lateral, can act as an incentive for banks to reduce credit risk. Thus, information from
relationship lending helps measure the credit risk to a certain extent. And, the collat-
eral security makes it, even more, convenient for banks to secure their loans.
Empirical results and discussion. We test whether banks size matters in relation-
ship lending with the availability of loans. According to the results, we accept the
hypothesis (H1) which suggests that this a significant difference between small and
large banks in SME credit availability through relationship lending. It indicates that
small banks provide more credits through relationship banking than the large banks.
Our result is consistent with the existing literature (Berger et al., 2005a; Uchida et al.,
2008; Carter et al., 2004; Bracanti, 2015; Ferri and Murro, 2015). These studies claim
that SMEs can benefit from small banks by having more credits due to long-term
relationships. As discussed, this could be explained by the fact that small banks have
an advantage in SME loan processing. Therefore, it could be argued that small banks
could be a suitable choice for SMEs in Bangladesh to get funds if they have a long-
lasting relationship. On the other hand, it could also be the fact that on the basis of
banking relationships, SMEs owner may come to bank branches and discuss their
loan requirements more personally with credit officer, and this may help credit offi-
cers analyse loan proposals beyond the accounting analysis. However, this sort of per-
sonal contact can be more challenging for a large institution due to a larger number
of customers, and hence SMEs credit can be constrained.
We examine whether the banks size matters in providing loans to SMEs under
lower interest rates due to long-lasting relationships. Surprisingly, with regards to
long-term relationship and interest rate on lending, this study rejects H2 since we did
not find any evidence on relationship lending and interest rate. However, several stu-
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dies show that relationship lending, in particular in small banks, can reduce the inter-
est rates of loans as a result of increased transparency (Comeig et al., 2015; Berger et
al., 2005a; Uchida et al., 2008; Bracanti, 2015). On the other hand, as stated by
P. Bolton et al. (2013) and L. Menkhoff et al. (2012) collateral along with a long-term
relationship can reduce the interest rates for SME loans. Therefore, it may also be the
case in the case of Bangladesh that only lending relationships will not be enough for
loans with lower interest rates and, in that case, bank size is irrelevant. Although, we
did not quantify the impact of collateral on the pricing of SME loans, it can be an
interesting area for future research.
We also examined (H3) whether strong bank-borrower relationship matters in
reducing interest rates on future loans. This study accepts H3 and it could be the fact
that our sample does not provide any evidence of a hold-up problem due to data li-
mitation. Since, there are some studies which suggest that when the relationship
between banks and SMEs is more exclusive and when banks can extract more private
information from firms, banks can ask for higher interest rates from the firm due to a
holding-up problem (Gama and Durate, 2015; Stein, 2014). However, our results
suggest that small banks can provide loans under lower interest rates to SMEs when
they have more exclusive relationships and our result is opposite to the results of
A.P.M. Gama and F.D. Durate (2015) and I. Stein (2014). Hence, with this evidence
we can say that small banks’ credit officers are willing to provide loans to SMEs with
lower interest rates when they have a strong relationship. It may be the fact that
despite a client having an account with a bank for a long time, if the client is not inter-
acting with the bank frequently it may not be helpful for the client to get loans from
the bank with lower interest rates.
If small banks have information superiority in terms of relationship lending and
in processing of small loans, then we expect that small banks may also ask for lower
collateral from SMEs. However, this study rejects H4 because we do not have enough
evidence to state that SMEs can ask for loans from small banks with a lower collater-
al requirement. This result is consistent with that of H. Uchida et al. (2008), they have
shown that relationship lending cannot reduce collateral requirement for firms and it
is constant regardless the bank size. This result may be due to the inefficiency of loan
officers to collect all the information required for a collateral free loan. Or, it may be
so that small banks are very conservative to give loans without collateral, due to the
ex-post moral hazard of clients. Since, it is argued that collateral can reduce the ex-
post moral hazard of borrowers due to their personal asset is secured with banks
(Hernandaz-Canovas and Martinez-Solano, 2010; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Lehmann
and Neuberger, 2001). 
Finally, we examine whether the significance of a long-term relationship and
collateral valued by small and large banks for lowering the SMEs credit risk. As dis-
cussed, soft information generated from relationship banking is highly used in the
context of SME financing. Hence, if there is any small bank advantage in the bank-
ing sector of Bangladesh then we expect there will be a correlation between bank size,
long-term relationship and collateral in SME credit risk. Our result is statistically sig-
nificant and we claim that small banks give more priority to relationship lending and
collateral in assessing credit risk than large banks. Explanation of the result can be
two-fold. On one hand, loan managers may be satisfied with soft information that is
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acquired during the relationship period and hence ask for collateral to strengthen
credit security. On the other hand, it can be a common practice among small banks
to provide loans with collateral due to their small asset base. Despite all the efforts if
a loan is default due to bad business conditions then banks can sell collateralized
assets of borrowers and can get back their investments (Menkhoff et al., 2012;
Hanedar et al., 2014). Thus, collateral can act as a safety net for small banks to reco-
ver loan in the default case.
Conclusion. This paper examines the relationship between bank size and banking
relationships in the context of Bangladeshi SME loan market. Moreover, this is the
first study which investigates bank size and lending relationships and its impact on
credit availability, interest rates, collateral requirement and the interaction between
relationship and collateral in reducing SME credit risk in the context of Bangladesh.
As discussed earlier, small banks have an advantage in processing soft information due
to organizational structure and, as a result, they can extend more loans to SMEs than
large banks. We found evidence that SMEs can benefit from small banks by main-
taining a long-term relationship, and information generated from the relationship
banking helps small firms get more finance. In line with this finding, we can argue
that if small banks provide more credits to SMEs due to a long-term relationship then
it can be a suitable choice for SMEs to go to small banks rather than the large ones
for loans. On the other hand, we did not find any evidence that small banks can pro-
vide loans to SMEs with lower interest rates or with lower collateral due to their long-
term relationships with the client. Hence, this study suggests that collateral act as an
incentive for small banks to invest in relationship banking. Nonetheless, we find evi-
dence that a stronger and much exclusive relationship with small banks can reduce
future interest rates for SMEs. This result also suggests that the hold-up problem is
not available at least with small banks and sharing more private information is not a
suboptimal choice for SMEs to get loans. We also find evidence that small banks give
priority to both long-term relationship information and collateral in their SME cred-
it risk management. However, we cannot rule out about large banks’ credit risk man-
agement policy without further examination of their risk management characteristics.
From the policy perspective, our results suggest that if small banks have an
advantage in processing small loans, in that case, small banks can be given more
authority and also incentives from the government to promote more SME loans to
develop the SME sector in Bangladesh. On the other hand, if SMEs are credit
rationed by large banks due to centralized decision-making process than decentra-
lization can be initiated to see the viability of decentralization on SMEs loans.
This paper has some limitations due to a small sample size. More importantly,
our sample does not cover all commercial banks in Bangladesh. Similarly, we did not
measure bank-borrower distance and market competition on relationship lending and
its effect on credit availability, interest rates, collateral and credit risk management.
Although, we have discussed their effect on relationship lending elsewhere in this
paper we are leaving them for future research.
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